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INTRODUCTION
With rhythmic ducking and loud squawking unmatched by any conventional
henhouse, Congress worries about the strength and growth of the United States
economy. Presidents participate in this process, fertilizing new ideas and proudly
announcing new laws which are hatched in the Congressional nest.
One significant and ever present issue in this area is the effect of the federal
income tax on the economy. Does the tax impose such a burden on saving,
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law; J.D. 1981,
University of Michigan; LL.M. (Taxation) 1986, New York University. This article is dedicated
to my best friend, Dr. Dean W. Livelybrooks, Ph.D. (Physics), who (along with his wife,
Lisa) housed my wife and me while I was writing this article. I am also indebted to my
colleagues Michael Chellis, Mary Lou Fellows, and Jami Changaris Voge for substantive and
editorial comments which greatly improved this piece.
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investment, and business expenditures (hereinafter, investment)' that economic
growth is unacceptably curtailed? Various Congresses, with the necessary help
from their respective Presidents, have adopted laws that reflect a persistent belief
that certain types of investments should receive significant protection from the
full weight of the Internal Revenue Code [hereinafter, the Code]. Such protection
has been provided in many different ways, including the long term capital gain
deduction,2 the investment tax credit,3 accelerated depreciation, 4 and the partial
exclusion of dividends received by individuals,5 among others.
A cynic might argue that Presidents, Senators, and Representatives usually
have much greater personal investments than most of their constituents, and
therefore are adopting the foregoing tax benefits purely out of self-interest. A
well informed cynic might consider the unusually large campaign contributions
received by members of the tax writing committees in Congress,6 and conclude
that self-interest is being furthered in a different, but more lucrative way. On
the surface, however, the comments by politicians about tax benefits for
investments indicate that the politicians who support such benefits believe that
they will enhance the strength and growth of the economy, for the benefit of
1. Although the terms "saving," "investment," and "business expenditure" may describe
separate and distinct concepts for some purposes, I am proposing that they all be treated
similarly for the tax purposes addressed herein. Therefore, for convenience, hereinafter, the
term "investment" generally will be used to describe all nonconsumptive expenditures, from
a simple savings account, through the purchase of securities, to the purchase of buildings and
equipment for use in an operating business. Occasionally, when I need to distinguish between
nearly risk free deposits such as bank accounts and U.S. government bonds and more risky
uses of funds, I will use "savings" for the former and "investment" for the latter concept.
2. I.R.C. § 1202 (1982) (repealed 1986). Capital gain protection was first adopted in 1921,
by Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, § 206, 42 Stat. 227, 232-33 (1921). Unlike the
other three incentive provisions mentioned in the text, the long term capital gain deduction is
often defended by numerous other arguments, which are not based on investment incentive
policies. See, e.g., Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 Taxes 247
(1957). In my opinion, all of the arguments in support of a capital gains preference fail under
close scrutiny, except the argument based on investment incentive policies.
3. I.R.C. § 46 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). An investment tax credit was first adopted in
1962, by Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 2, 76 Stat. 960, 962-73 (1962).
4. I.R.C. §§ 167, 168 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Significant acceleration of depreciation
deductions began with I.R.C. § 167 in 1954, under Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L.
No. 83-591, § 167, 68A Stat. 1, 51-52 (1954), and generally increased through periodic
enactments until the 1986 Act.
5. I.R.C. § 116 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (repealed 1986). This provision was first enacted
in 1954, by Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 116, 68A Stat. 1, 37
(1954).
6. On average, [1986] PAC [political action committee] contributions to members
of the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committees were substantially
greater than contributions to members not connected with the tax reform legis-
lation . . . . The average PAC contribution to incumbents in the House for
1986 was $140,000, but the average Ways and Means Committee member received
nearly $240,000 from PACs . . . . The average Senate incumbent received $800,000
from PACs this year, while the four Finance Committee incumbents averaged $I
million in PAC contributions.
Hanlon, PACs Pad Taxwriters' Campaign Accounts, 33 Tax Notes 529, 529-30 (1986).
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all people.7 Such tax benefits will lure ever increasing amounts of capital into
the productive sector of our economy, thereby producing ever increasing amounts
of goods, services, and jobs for all people to enjoy. In this superficially altruistic
view of the issue, investors and business owners are simply machines, which are
being used to improve the lives of all members of society. Tax benefits for
investments and businesses are, of course, the grease necessary to keep those
machines in good condition.
In the ultimate "big picture," the only two elements comprising an economy
are capital and labor. The tax benefits of the type discussed above are intended
to increase the amount of capital invested in the economy. The Reagan
administration apparently viewed labor as also deserving of some encouragement
in the form of tax benefits." That encouragement was given by reducing the
marginal tax rates applicable to every income class.9 In many income classes,
that reduction was dramatic.'0
7. "Rep. Patrick L. Swindall, R-Ga., has introduced H.R. 4913, which would reinstate
the installment method of accounting for retail dealers. Swindall argued that although repeal
of the installment method was intended to raise revenue, it has had the opposite effect by
retarding economic growth." Gray, Congressional Record, 40 TAX NoTEs 105, 105 (1988);
Sen. Chic Hecht, R-Nev., has introduced S. 2341, which would restore the full
deductibility of IRA contributions and allow up to a $2,000 IRA deduction for
a nonworking spouse. Hecht called his bill "an important step in returning the
incentives to Americans to help save for their futures." Hecht noted that by
June 1987, IRA assets plus those in Keogh plans resulted in savings of over $350
billion. He argued that this money represents a "long-term capital investment
that will boost the American growth and productivity."
Gray, Congressional Record, 39 TAx NoTEs 777, 777 (1988);
[Senator] Kasten writes that fears about cutting the [capital gain] tax are mis-
placed, and he argues that a reduction would pass four of the major tests of tax
reform-fairness, equity, efficiency, and economic growth ...
Stating that the Federal government can and should support America's com-
petitive edge, [Senators] Cranston and Boschwitz write that this can best be done
by using the tax code to direct private investments into "the often risky and
long-term ventures that become the job and economic miracles of the future."
Jones, Commentary, 39 TAx NoTEs 283, 283-84 (1988).
8. But in one very fundamental way President Reagan was a natural advocate of
tax reform; he had a passionate desire for lower individual tax rates. He had
vivid memories of his days as a young Hollywood actor, when he was reluctant
to make too many movies in one year because more than 90 percent of his pay
would go to the government . . . . [O]n his list of domestic priorities, cutting
personal tax rates ranked first, second and third.
J. BIRNBAUM & A. MuRRAY, SHowDowN AT Gucci GuieH: LAWMaAKERs, LoBBYIsTs, AND THE
UNIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAx REroRm 21-22 (1987). I am grateful to Bryan Slone, Assistant to
the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, for providing me with this Reagan anecdote
and its citation.
9. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101, 95 Stat. 172, 176-85
(1981); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 101, 100 Stat. 2085, 2097-99 (1986).
10. In the 1981 Act, the rate for the top income class was reduced from 70% to 50%,
which was a 28% reduction; all the other taxable income classes enjoyed reductions (phased
in by 1984) of at least 21% of their pre-1981 rates (analyzing rates for married taxpayers filingjointly). Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 101, 95 Stat. 172, 176-
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The rate reductions, however, benefitted not only laborers but capitalists as
well. The tax benefits available only to capital were retained and even increased
during the early Reagan years,' 2 thus maintaining the relative position of capital
as the favorite child in the economic family.
This traditional family relationship crumbled in the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(hereinafter, the 1986 Act). The rooster and the hens became addicted to an
extremely expensive drug known as "low rates." Maintaining capital as a favorite
child apparently was sacrificed to help pay for this addiction. The investment
tax credit, 3 the deduction for long term capital gain,'4 and the partial exclusion
for dividends received by an individual 5 were all repealed by the 1986 Act.
Accelerated depreciation on real estate was changed to the straight line method
and the depreciation period was lengthened from 19 years to 27.5 or 31.5 years,
depending on the type of property. 6 Although the acceleration in calculating
depreciation of personal property was increased, that benefit was offset for
most categories of personal property by a lengthening of the depreciation
period. 7
85 (1981).
In the 1986 Act, the rate for the top income class was reduced from 50% to 28%, which
was a 44% reduction; some of the lowest taxable income classes experienced increased rates
(which were generally offset by other changes such as the larger personal exemption), and the
taxable income classes in the middle enjoyed reductions as high as 46% from their pre-1986
rates (analyzing rates for married taxpayers filing jointly and adjusting for the 1986 conversion
of the zero bracket amount to a standard deduction). Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-514, § 101, 100 Stat. 2085, 2096-99.
11. The 1981 reduction of the top rate from 70% to 50% benefitted only capital because
the previous maximum tax of I.R.C. § 1348 (repealed 1981) had protected most earned income
from the rates above 50%.
12. The 1981 Act allowed most business equipment to be depreciated over a five year
period, and most depreciable real estate to be depreciated over fifteen years. Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 201, 95 Stat. 172, 203-19 (1981). For many assets,
this was an extreme reduction in depreciation period.
13. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 211, 100 Stat. 2085, 2166-70 (1986)
repealed the investment tax credit.
14. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301, 100 Stat. 2085, 2216-18 (1986)
repealed the deduction for long term capital gain.
15. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 612, 100 Stat. 2085, 2250-51 (1986)
repealed the partial exclusion for dividends received by an individual.
16. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 201, 100 Stat. 2085, 2121-42 (1986).
17. Id. The most helpful way to compare the values of two different depreciation schedules
is to calculate the present value of the deductions allowed by each method. The depreciation
system in effect immediately before the 1986 Act was called Accelerated Cost Recovery System,
or ACRS; the system adopted by the 1986 Act is known among tax professionals as Modified
ACRS, or MACRS (I.R.C. § 168 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), in each case). Each system begins
by categorizing an asset according to its "class life" under the Asset Depreciation Range
(ADR), as defined in I.R.C. § 167(m) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) and Rev. Proc. 83-85, 1983-1
C.B. 745, so that common point is an appropriate place to begin a comparison of the two
systems.
Under (old) ACRS, a $1,000 asset with a four year ADR class life produced deductions
over three years with a discounted present value of $901; under (new) MACRS, the same asset
generates deductions over four years with a discounted present value of $915-a 1.6% increase
[Vol. 64:665
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Until the Tax Reform Act of 1986, capital had long been the favorite child
of tax policy. Although much of that favoritism appears to have been abandoned
in 1986, there is a strong discomfort with that decision in the political and tax
policy arenas. 8 One can easily come to the common sense realization that
increasing one's savings causes an immediate, albeit short-run, reduction in one's
standard of living, and therefore may require some encouragement; while
increasing one's labor generates a prompt increase in one's standard of living,
and therefore contains its own immediate incentive mechanism. Even though
increased saving will usually increase one's future standard of living, this is a
long-term enticement, to which modem Americans do not respond well. The
media report dutifully and regularly on the low savings rate in the United States,
and the much higher savings rate in our current economic role model, Japan. 19
Without attempting a conclusive economic analysis of the need for capital
formation incentives, this article assumes that the historic tax policy favoritism
for capital will soon be re-established.
Assuming the Code will be used to encourage saving and investment, this
article proposes a particular approach which can be used to achieve that goal.
First, a foundation is laid by a comparison of use-based rules to source-based
rules, and a discussion of why a use-based system is preferable. The central
idea is then presented. It is similar to Professor Andrews' cash flow consumption
for the taxpayer. For an asset with a six or eight year ADR class life, the ACRS deductions
had a present value of $825, while the MACRS deductions have a present value of $850-a
3.0% increase for the taxpayer. In contrast, the ACRS deductions for an asset with a ten,
twelve, or fourteen year ADR class life had a present value of $825, while the MACRS
deductions have a present value of $794-a 3.8% decrease in value. Assets with an ADR class
life of sixteen or eighteen years suffered the greatest reduction, falling from $825 to $719-a
12.8% decrease in the present value of the allowable depreciation deductions. These figures
are based on a 10% discount rate.
18. See supra note 7;
[S]upply-side optimism, exemplified by [then] Vice President and Presidential
aspirant George Bush, ... argues that reducing the capital gains rates will
generate more economic activity and jobs and will, thereby, increase the Federal
government's overall tax take. Given the size of the government's deficit after
six years of applying this principle more generally, few people seem much inclined
to heed him.
Huddleston, Treasury Study Suggests That Lower Capital Gains Rates May Actually Boost
Federal Revenue, 39 TAx Noas 1144, 1144 (1988).
19. Americans save less of their income than nearly any other major industrialized
nation. And according to preliminary second-quarter figures by the Commerce
Department, the annual personal savings rate in the United States this year
dropped to 3.2% of total income-a postwar low ...
Americans always have been relatively low savers, even at the peaks of U.S.
economic growth. The personal savings rate averaged 6.7% of disposable income
during the 1960's; 8% during the 1970's; and 6.4% between 1980 and 1985-far
lower than other industrialized nations. In 1985, for example, the U.S. personal
savings rate was 5.1%, while in Japan it was 22.5%, in West Germany it was
13%, and in Britain it was 11.9%.




tax,2D yet different in an important way which addresses Professor Warren's
valid criticism of the Andrews proposal.2 1 Briefly, a tax system is proposed that
will tax individuals on the amounts they spend for personal consumption, and
tax business entities on the amounts that are invested in (or reinvested by) those
entities.
The subjects of contributions to and distributions from a corporation are
analyzed, and rules are developed to complement the primary tax law changes
proposed herein. Any reader with an interest in simplifying the Code (by moving
forward, rather than back to some nostalgic prior era) should enjoy the
discussion of the numerous statutory rules and trial court issues which can be
eliminated upon the adoption of the proposal described herein. Because some
readers will criticize a proposed goal simply for lack of a clear path to that
goal, the major transition issues are identified and put to rest in the final section
of this article.
I. EVALUATION OF INVESTMENT INCENTIVES
A. Use Versus Source Incentives
The Code has contained both use-based and source-based incentives for
investment. A use-based rule is one which provides a tax benefit based on the
use to which one's funds are put. For example, the investment tax credit that
was repealed in 198622 gave an immediate tax benefit to a taxpayer who used
his or her available funds to purchase certain types of assets. The benefit was
available regardless of the source of those funds; they could have come from
the taxpayer's labor, from prior investments, or from a loan from the local
bankn
A slightly different type of use-based incentive is exemplified by accelerated
depreciation and the new tax credit for low-income housing.2? Although the
benefit is still granted for making the desired use of one's funds, the benefit is
enjoyed in increments, over a period of years, rather than all in the first year.
There are several practical distinctions between immediate and gradual tax
benefits. Such practical differences are important in constructing a proposal for
20. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HAnv. L. REv.
1113 (1974).
21. Warren, Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88
HARv. L. REv. 931 (1975).
22. I.R.C. § 38 (Supp. IV 1986) and I.R.C. § 46 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The investment
tax credit was repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 211, 100 Stat.
2085, 2166-70 (1986) (enacting I.R.C. § 49 (Supp. IV 1986)).
23. In certain instances, investment of the proceeds of a nonrecourse loan did not qualify
for the credit. See I.R.C. § 46(c)(8) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
24. I.R.C. § 168 (Supp. IV 1986).
25. I.R.C. § 42 (Supp. IV 1986).
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a tax incentive mechanism or system. First, benefits that are fully enjoyed in
the first year are probably more effective as incentives, 26 but because of their
immediacy they also provide the strongest temptation to abuse them. Second,
although most tax preferences constitute government subsidies to the qualifying
taxpayers, the subsidy is apparent to more people (i.e., to less sophisticated
voters) when it is given immediately. This may be desirable if significant amounts
of investment funds are held by unsophisticated investors. 27 On the other hand,
any subsidy that might not have broad support from the voters can be more
effectively hidden if it is structured as a gradual tax benefit. Finally, the
effectiveness of gradual benefits in inducing people to make certain investments
may be undermined if potential investors fear that a later Congress will change
the law before all the expected benefits have been received. 2 The 1986 Act
eliminated many of the benefits promised by the Economic Recovery and Tax
Act of 1981, even for those investors who had already purchased assets in
response to the 1981 Act.29 Future Congresses which want to use the gradual
benefits method may find that they have to offer even greater amounts of
benefits to incite the desired response from untrusting investors.
The Code also contains source-based incentives for investment, which provide
preferential tax treatment to income from certain specified sources. For example,
before the 1986 Act, gain from the sale of a long-term capital asset" was taxed
at a much lower rate than gain from the sale of an ordinary asset, or income
from labor.31 The benefit was not affected by the taxpayer's use of the money;
it could be reinvested, spent on necessities like food and clothing, or spent on
cocaine and fast cars. Another example of a source-based incentive was the
exclusion of the first $100 of dividends received by an individual, which was
26. Theoretically, a rational investor should be concerned only with the discounted present
value of the various tax benefit packages being considered, so any comparison of current and
future benefits is just tweedle-dum versus tweedie-dee. Such a theoretical view suffers two
weaknesses, however. First, from my experience in practice, there are many investors, holding
a large aggregate investment fund, who are not rational. This seems especially true when the
analysis involves tax benefits. "Tax shelter(!)" is an hallucinogenic drug for many people.
Second, even a rational investor may apply a discount rate to future tax benefits that is
higher than the discount rate used by the government in calculating the present value of its
cost in providing the benefits. (On an admittedly intuitive basis, I think the reverse is unlikely.)
In such a case, the government will achieve greater taxpayer stimulation for a given present
value cost by offering an immediate benefit.
27. See id.
28. To state this more precisely, such uncertainty, like any other, raises the discount rate
applied by the investor to the future benefits. See supra note 26.
29. I.R.C. § 469(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
30. I use the phrase "long-term capital asset" as a convenient label for a capital asset that
has been held by the taxpayer for the time required by I.R.C. § 1222(3) (Supp. IV 1986) to
give rise to long-term capital gain if it is sold (usually 6 or 12 months). It is not, however, a
technically defined term in tax law.
31. I.R.C. § 1202 (1982), repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §
301, 100 Stat. 2085, 2216-18 (1986). In fact, § 1202 provided a deduction, not a lower tax
rate, but the effect was identical to a lower rate and it is commonly described as such.
1989]
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also repealed in 1986.32 Again, the benefit was based on the source of the
income, and the use of that income was irrelevant. Unlike the use-based
incentives, benefits from source-based rules are always received in the year the
income in question is received.
Finally, it is possible to combine use and source requirements into a single
tax rule. Simple hypothetical illustrations can be created from the two recently
repealed, source-based incentives mentioned above: Imagine a capital gain
deduction that only applied to capital gains that were immediately reinvested in
capital assets; or a dividend exclusion that required the taxpayer to purchase
more stock with the protected dividends.
For actual, rather than hypothetical examples, the Code contains several
major rules which require both a specific source and a specific use of the income
to obtain the available tax benefit: the various nonrecognition rules. For example,
if a taxpayer exchanges stock of one corporation (source requirement) for stock
of another corporation (use requirement) pursuant to the corporate reorgani-
zation provisions of the Code,33 the applicable nonrecognitionM4 and substituted
basis35 rules will delay the tax liability until the taxpayer later disposes of the
new stock in a taxable transaction.
Although the participant in a nonrecognition transaction is usually very
conscious of the tax benefit and probably thinks she has received the benefit
all in the first year, in fact she will receive the benefit gradually. Because the
gain on the old stock will eventually be taxed when the new stock is sold,3 the
only benefit from a nonrecognition rule is the deferral of the tax liability.
Deferral is a benefit that is enjoyed incrementally, with the passage of time.Y
To reinstate the traditional favored status of capital in the Code, one issue
that must be addressed is whether the appropriate tax incentive mechanism(s)
adopted to achieve such goal should be use-based or source-based. As mentioned
earlier, modem Americans do not seem to respond well to promises of future
reward.3 8 This trait is probably a fundamental part of human nature, but its
32. I.R.C. § 116 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-514, § 612, 100 Stat. 2085, 2250-51 (1986).
33. I.R.C. § 368(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
34. I.R.C. § 354(a) (1982).
35. I.R.C. § 358(a) (1982). The term "substituted basis" is used here in the pre-1984 sense
developed by the tax bar, before Congress presumptuously redefined it, to the unfortunate
confusion of us all. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(42-44) (Supp. IV 1986).
36. This assumes that the potential gain is not lost through any post-reorganization reduction
in the value of the stock.
37. The only nonrecognition rule providing its full benefit immediately is the rule allowing
nonrecognition when a decedent's assets pass to her estate, or its beneficiaries, because I.R.C.
§ 1014 (1982) provides a fair market value basis for the assets. Thus, the benefit is not mere
deferral, but complete and immediate escape from tax liability. The tax treatment of decedents'
assets, however, does not appear to be intended as an investment incentive.
38. The comment in the text is made with respect to earthly rewards, but modem religious
leaders may bemoan its aptness in another context. I am not speculating, however, on any
possible connection between the two! Cf. supra note 19.
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strength may vary from one culture to another and from one era to another.
If Americans need an immediate incentive to convince them to invest, where
will they find it? Except when tax benefits reach extreme levels, the expected
economic return from an investment is normally the largest component of the
total return from the investment, and is inevitably a future reward. If a potential
investor wants any immediate reward for his decision to save, rather than
consume, he must find it in the Code.
The Code speaks to the people whose economic lives it governs. Regardless
of whether it speaks with a use-based or source-based accent, to effectively
encourage investment requires the Code to address a taxpayer when he holds a
discretionary dollar in his hand, when he is deciding whether to consume now
or save for future consumption. Listen to the attempted temptation of the old
source-based capital gain deduction provision, speaking at the time a taxpayer
is trying to decide whether to spend or save a part of his discretionary funds.
"Forget that ten day trip to Hawaii. Use that money to invest in a capital
asset, and if the investment is successful, in three years the government will
help pay for a fourteen day trip to Hawaii." 39
Compare that to the attempted allure of the recently repealed, use-based
investment tax credit. "Forget that ten day trip to Hawaii. Use the money to
invest in a qualifying asset, and within three months4° the government will send
you a check for a long weekend at Key West. If the investment is successful,
you can still have the ten days in Hawaii later. ' 4'
The latter approach is better suited to our "enjoy now, pay later" society.
Whether our preference for immediate gratification arises from human nature,
cultural traditions, or some other source, it provides a strong argument for use-
based, rather than source-based investment incentives. Not only is there a
substantial difference in the timing of the reward, but the use-based method
also guarantees the tax portion of the reward regardless of the success of the
investment. The tax benefit from a source-based incentive such as the capital
gain deduction is contingent upon the success of the investment.
B. The Political Nature of Traditional Investment Incentives
Assuming then that the preferable method for reinstating capital as the favorite
child in the Code is a use-based mechanism, Congress could look for new
methods of implementing that favoritism, or it could reenact some or all of the
old methods. The old methods should not be used. Consider the nature of the
decisions being made by Congress in this regard. Fundamentally, the first
39. I.R.C. § 1202 (1982) (repealed 1986) (English translation) (emphasis added).
40. The three month period assumes the taxpayer pays substantial quarterly estimated tax
payments, which can be reduced or eliminated in response to the investment. A reduction in
the taxpayer's withholding might recover the benefit even sooner.
41. I.R.C. §§ 38, 46 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (English translation) (emphasis added).
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decision by Congress is the very general one that Americans should shift some
of their available funds from consumption to investment. Just as uses of labor
and capital are the only two ways to make money, consumption and investment
are the only two ways to spend it.
Perhaps most Americans would concede that Congress has the wisdom to
make this "consume less, invest more" decision, and that the tax law might
properly be used to encourage saving. Adoption of the old methods of encour-
aging investment, however, goes well beyond that decision, and attempts to
direct investment funds into certain types of assets. For instance, the capital
gain deduction, accelerated depreciation, and the investment tax credit reflect
decisions by Congress that capital assets, buildings, and equipment are more
important to the strength and growth of our economy than inventories and
interest bearing financial instruments. Assets in the former categories qualify
their owners for substantial tax benefits, either when acquired (use-based rules)
or when sold (source-based rules); in contrast, the latter asset categories generate
little or no tax benefit. Even among the preferred categories, there is much
variation. Assets as unproductive as gold bullion enjoy(ed) the same capital gain
preference as corporate stock. Income from buildings is taxed much differently
than income from nondepreciable assets. Income from equipment receives a
significantly different set of benefits, especially when the investment tax credit
is in force.
All these different investment incentives, the effects of which are nearly
immeasurable,42 should lead to some demanding questions. Has Congress held
the entire U.S. economy in its hands, wisely and accurately measuring the
economy's need for more or less of each category of investment? No. The most
one can hope for is that they are guessing in good faith. Does Congress react
periodically, astutely, to the ebbs and flows of investment funds among the
various categories, adjusting the amount of the capital gain deduction, the
length of the long-term holding period, the rate of the investment tax credit,
and the length and shape of the various depreciation schedules? No. Such
adjustments are forged by the force of the world's largest deficits being pressed
against a red hot budget; then they are machined to their ultimate shape by
high-speed, diamond-tipped lobbyists.
If the balance of more, or less, or no tax benefits among the various
investment categories is being determined by such arbitrary forces, perhaps one
42. The purpose of the papers presented at the Brookings Conference on the Effects
of Tax Policy on Investment was to develop models of fixed investment behavior
of United States business firms and to evaluate the impact on capital spending
of federal tax incentives enacted since the end of the Second World War. The
conference did not resolve the issue of the effectiveness of the tax incentives that
were used. Four papers were prepared by competent scholars. Each had the
objective of measuring the same phenomenon. Each obtained a significantly
different answer.
TAx INCN TNrEs AND CAPrrAL SPENING 1 (G. Fromm ed. 1971) (emphasis added).
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can fairly inquire whether some alternative mechanism is available to strike the
balance. This author does not believe that Congress has the wisdom to decide
when the economy needs more apartments and fewer office buildings, or more
farm equipment and less money in bank deposits, or any other balance between
competing alternative investments. This article is based upon the conclusion that
Congress should restrict its investment encouragement to the generic "consume
less, invest more" type, and allow the forces of the (relatively) free market to
lead the resulting saved dollars to the appropriate investment categories.
To accomplish the foregoing division of authority between Congress and the
market, any post-1986 increase in the Code's capital formation incentive should
be in a new form, available to all categories of investment, rather than a
reenactment of the old methods that reward only certain types of investments.
II. PROPOSED SOLUTION
A. A Starting Point: Professor Andrews' Cash Flow
Consumption Tax
The foregoing argument in favor of an investment-neutral, use-based incentive
leads to the preliminary conclusion that the ideal tax system would be that in
which all consumed income is reported by individuals and all invested income
is reported by separately taxable entities, such as corporations. Such complete
separation of all income according to its use would allow the development of
rules and rates designed specifically for one type of income use. For example,
Congress could decide that a 50% marginal tax rate is appropriate for a person
who spends $1,000,000 per year on personal consumption. Under the current
tax system, the desire to heavily tax that level of luxury living is tempered by
the knowledge that the 50% rate will also fall on some income that this person
decided to invest. The rate ultimately adopted is a compromise and probably is
not the most desired result for either category of income.
In a similar vein, the 1986 Act reflects a decision to allow the deduction of
interest paid or accrued in a trade or business,43 but to severely limit the
deduction of interest paid on personal use loans. 44 Because individuals report
both consumptive and investment income and deductions on their tax returns,
the fungibility of money will greatly inhibit the enforceability of the policy
decision reflected in the new interest deduction rules. If all invested income,
and thus all business and investment activity, were reported by corporations,
Congress could grant an unlimited interest deduction to corporations, and deny
the interest deduction to individuals. The restriction against deducting interest
for personal use loans would be much more easily enforced than it is currently,
43. I.R.C. § 163(a) (West 1988).
44. I.R.C. § 163(h) (West 1988).
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and there would be no concern about the unintended impact of one rule on
the other category of interest.
One system that effectively separates consumed income from invested income
is the cash flow consumption tax, which was thoroughly described by Professor
William Andrews in 1974. 45 Under Professor Andrews' proposal, all business
and investment expenditures are deductible. 46 Thus, all business and investment
assets have a zero basis, depreciation is eliminated, and upon the sale of an
asset the entire sale price is income.
Invested income is thereby removed from all individual income tax returns,
as proposed above, but it is not shifted to the return of any other taxable
entity. Invested income is completely removed from the national tax base. Profits
earned with the invested income also are not taxed, if they are reinvested. The
original invested income and the profits earned with it are not taxed until they
are withdrawn from the investment and spent on personal consumption.
The Andrews system goes too far. A well known mathematical analysis shows
that if investment principal is deducted initially, and investment profits are not
taxed as they are earned, with the entire amount taxed only when it is withdrawn
at the conclusion of the investment, the economic effect is equivalent to a zero
rate of tax on the earnings from the investment.47 For those who are not
familiar with this analysis, consider that a substantial tax savings is generated
by the deduction of the initial investment. If the taxpayer also invests that tax
savings, the tax due at the end of the investment can be paid entirely with the
original tax savings and the profits earned thereon in the interim. The profits
earned by the taxpayer's initial investment are thus left untouched.
Professor Alvin Warren has expanded upon the foregoing criticism of a cash
flow consumption tax.4 As stated above, a consumption tax effectively imposes
no tax upon the earnings from investments. If investments (i.e., capital) and
labor are the only two sources of income, and the income from capital is not
45. Andrews, supra note 20.
46. Id. at 1116.
47. Under the current income tax system, if a taxpayer in the 33% bracket has $1,500
before taxes, and wants to buy a bond, he must pay $500 in tax and buy a $1,000 bond with
the remaining funds. If the bond pays 9% ($90 per year), with principal and interest both due
at the end of one year, he will receive $1,090 at year's end, pay $30 tax on the interest, and
have $1,060 after tax. More importantly for this comparison, if the interest is not taxed, i.e.,
a 0% rate on investment earnings, he will have $1,090 after tax.
The latter result is identical to this taxpayer's experience under a consumption tax. Because
the bond purchase is deductible, he can buy a $1,500 bond without paying any tax on his
initial investment. This larger bond, also earning 9%, will pay $1,635 at the end of the year
($1,500 principal and $135 interest). Because the bond purchase was deductible, the taxpayer
has no basis in the bond, and the entire $1,635 is income. The 33% tax will claim $545,
leaving $1,090 after tax. This is the same after-tax result as in the last sentence of the previous
paragraph, when the bond was purchased with nondeductible dollars and the interest was not
taxed at all.
48. Warren, supra note 21.
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taxed, it appears that labor is bearing the tax burden alone. Thus, the traditional
tax policy favoritism for capital is carried to the extreme. Assuming that such
an extreme result is not acceptable, 49 in drafting an investment incentive Congress
must find some middle ground between the current system and the extreme
position of the cash flow consumption tax. Such a "middle ground" system
would allow income from capital to be taxed at a rate greater than zero, but
less than the rate at which labor income is taxed.54 Ideally, this system would
also be flexible (allowing easy adjustment up or down between zero and the
labor tax rate) and simpler than the current system, and have the neutrality
that fosters economic efficiency.
B. A Modified Version of the Andrews Consumption Tax
A system satisfying the foregoing criteria can be created. First, treat all
business entities (including sole proprietorships) as separately taxable entities. If
a taxpayer is allowed a deduction for all capital contributions to business entities,
that invested income will be removed from her tax return by the deduction. 51
The contribution to the business entity must then be treated as income of the
entity, because the goal is to tax that income under a separate regime, not to
exempt it from tax entirely. Income earned from the use of the contributed
capital will also, of course, be income of the entity.
Eventually, when the funds begin to flow out from the business entity to the
business owner (e.g., shareholder, partner, etc.) for consumptive uses, the process
is reversed. A distribution to an owner with respect to her stock or other
ownership interest (whether an operating or a redemption distribution) will be
fully deductible by the entity, and fully includable in the income of the recipient.
The foregoing pair of deduction/inclusion rules does not, by itself, create any
favoritism for capital. The only function of these rules is to separate all income
49. It certainly is not acceptable to me.
50. I am aware that the current income tax system substantially accomplishes the goal
described in this sentence by the use of investment preferences such as those described earlier.
Two major elements of capital income are missed by those preferences, however. Interest is
taxed at the same rate as labor income, and dividends, due to the double taxation of corporate
profits, are taxed more heavily than labor income. Furthermore, the several preferred categories
of capital income are taxed at varying rates within this middle ground.
51. Unless other available tax incentives are extremely beneficial, the availability of a
current deduction only for a taxpayer's corporate investments would persuade her to conduct
all of her saving, investment, and business activities in the corporate form. Sole proprietorships
and partnerships with individual partners would no longer be used.
Such intrusion of the tax law into the business entity selection decision is unwarranted. Yet
the tax system described and proposed herein requires that the business entity receiving the
capital contribution must be a taxable entity. To solve this dilemma, sole proprietorships,
partnerships, business trusts and corporations should all be taxed under a single system of
business entity taxation that is similar to the current corporate tax, with the significant
modifications described below. Thus the use of the terms "business entity," "business," or
"entity" and "business owner," "owner," or "investor" throughout this article.
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according to use, without regard to source. Income earned elsewhere by the
owner's labor and invested in the business is reported on the business entity's
return, as is income earned by the entity's capital and re-invested. Income
earned by business capital and distributed to the owner for consumptive use is
reported on the owner's return, as is any labor income which the business
owner earns and consumes. Because all business entities will be subject to a
single, uniform system of entity taxation,52 all business and investment deductions
(except the individual investor's initial contribution deduction) will be reported
on a new "business entity" return, while all consumptive deductions (as in the
current system) will be reported on individual returns.
The foregoing rules and their effects set the stage for the preferential treatment
of capital. The preference is achieved by setting individual tax rates and business
entity tax rates at different levels. If the entity tax rate is reduced to zero, the
system becomes identical to Professor Andrews' cash flow consumption tax.53
If the entity rate is equal to the individual rate, there is no preferential treatment
of capital. When the business tax rate is greater than zero but less than the
individual rate, this system creates the "middle ground" mentioned above.
Capital receives more favorable tax treatment than labor, but still bears some
of the tax burden. Because the preference from the rate differential is available
to every capital contribution to any type of business entity, regardless of the
particular type of investment made by the entity, this system provides neutrality
with respect to the type of investment, as endorsed earlier.M The proposed tax
system distinguishes only between consumption and investment, and not between
any two categories of investment. Finally, not only is a use-based incentive
utilized to reward contributions to businesses, but the rate differential also
creates the appearance of a use-based penalty on consumptive withdrawals of
business funds. Analytically, there is no true penalty, but only the termination
of an ongoing benefit. The benefit is the right to defer the cost of the full,
individual tax rates for another day, another week, another year, or longer.
Nevertheless, after an investor has grown accustomed to the benefit, the threat
of losing it will probably inhibit consumptive withdrawals to some degree.
Although this system has a strong theoretical appeal, probably due to its
symmetry, at first glance it appears to have a fatal pragmatic flaw. Because
capital contributions are income to the recipient, while borrowed funds are not,
it appears that businesses will shun equity and finance their operations with
excessive proportions of debt. Current corporate tax law favors debt over equity,
52. See id.
53. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
54. This system provides economic neutrality between alternative business or investment
uses of capital, see supra note 42 and accompanying text, as well as entity selection neutrality,
see supra note 51.
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because interest paid to lenders is deductible,5 5 while dividends paid to stock-
holders are not. Some commentators argue that the current discrimination
against equity leads to an undesirable level of debt and resulting financial
weakness in the corporate sectorY7 Any system that significantly increased this
discrimination, and spread it to the other forms of business entities, would be
fatally flawed.
Close examination reveals that the actual effect of this proposed system would
be in precisely the opposite direction. The current preference of debt over equity
would be replaced with a preference for equity. First, the deductibility of
dividends paid eliminates the current advantage of debt over equity in the
corporate sector, thus creating a temporary balance between the two. To
understand the second step, one must first observe that any proposal of this
system presumes that Congress would establish a business tax rate substantially
lower than the highest individual rate. The investment incentive created by such
rate differential is the primary reason for adopting this proposed system. The
opportunity to practice legalized arbitrage with the rate differential, as explained
below, is the second step, which establishes a new advantage for equity over
debt.
Assume the top individual rate is 40%, and the business rate is a flat 20%.
If a potential individual investor has $1,000 of gross income (on which tax has
not yet been paid), he has two means by which he can make a direct investment
in a business entity which has an active use for his money. He can pay $400
tax on the $1,000, and loan the remaining $600 to the corporation. The loan
proceeds will not be income to the corporation, so it can employ the entire
$600 in its operations.
Alternatively, the individual can purchase a $1,000 equity interest in the
business. The deduction allowed for the purchase price will totally offset the
$1,000 of gross income, and he will owe no tax. The business entity, however,
will have $1,000 of income, and must pay $200 of tax. Eight hundred dollars
will remain for use in the business, as compared to only $600 in the loan
situation above. Assuming the business earns a pre-tax profit of 15% on its
assets, and pays two-thirds of that (10% of investible proceeds) to the supplier
of capital, the results for each party are illustrated below.
55. I.R.C. § 163(a) (1982).
56. The Code does not explicitly state that dividends are not deductible, but neither does
it authorize such a deduction. The general rule is that deductions are not allowed without
specific statutory authority. See B. BrrTKER & J. EusMcE, FEDERAL INComE TAXATION OF
CORPORATioNS AND SHAREHOLDERS 4-3 (5th ed. 1987).
57. "Reform [of insolvency workouts] should also invite inquiry into more global solutions.
The tax code's preferential treatment of debt could be altered, reducing the preference for
debt over equity financing and consequently reducing the aggregate costs of workout by
reducing the use of debt." Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J.













































































Both the individual and the entity earn a greater after-tax net profit by
structuring the individual's investment as an equity purchase rather than a loan.
This difference is not changed by including the return of the capital in the
calculations. Repayment of the $600 loan is not deductible by the entity, and
is not income to the lender. Thus the individual lender is left with $600 after
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tax, plus his $36 of after-tax interest. Because the redemption of the stock is
deductible by the business, it can distribute $1,000 to the shareholder and receive
a $200 tax savings or refund.18 The net distribution cost to the corporation
($800) is therefore the same as the net useable (after-tax) proceeds it initially
received from the equity invetor. Because the investor deducted the full amount
of his investment, his basis in the investment is zero, and the entire $1,000
redemption payment is income. After paying $400 tax on that income, he is
left with the same $600 after tax as he received in the loan repayment situation,
plus his $48 of after-tax dividend.
The difference in after-tax return is entirely due to the fact that under the
equity structure the parties are allowed to use $200 of the government's money,
as an incentive for the individual's decision to make this equity investment.
Note that the pre-tax gross profit is $30 higher ($120 vs. $90) in the equity
alternative. That $30 difference is from the 15% pre-tax return on the $200 tax
savings ($200 tax vs. $400 tax) generated by making the equity investment. The
$200 tax savings is only temporary, and is entirely reclaimed by the government
when the stock or other equity interest is redeemed, but only $10 of the $30
earned with that $200 is taken by this tax system ($8 by the 40%Vo individual
tax on the $20 (two-thirds) distributed to the investor and $2 by the 20%
business tax on the $10 (one-third) retained by the entity). The remaining $20
is a permanent benefit.
Even though the financial strength of American business may be better served
by a pro-equity bias than by the current prejudice against equity, the ideal of
theoretical tax policy is tax neutrality in investment decisions. There are legitimate
business reasons to use debt for some portion of a business' outside capital
needs. There are also legitimate investment reasons for an individual to prefer
lending over equity ownership. The foregoing numerical analysis indicates that
the proposed system places a tax pressure against those business and investment
purposes.
In fact, a supplier and a user of capital can establish a lending relationship,
without suffering the tax penalty illustrated above. That illustration is accurate
only for a direct transaction between an individual investor and an operating
business entity. If the individual creates a wholly owned investment corporation
and inserts it between herself and the operating entity, the tax benefits achieved
by the equity transaction above can be achieved by a capital contribution to
the personal investment corporation, followed by a loan to the operating
corporation. This result is illustrated below.
58. The operation of this proposed system requires that all tax savings from distributions

















x 20% Business tax rate
200 Business tax
=> $ 800 Net proceeds, loaned to Operating Entity
OPERATING Busnmss ENTITY
$ 800 Loan proceeds
x 15% Pre-tax return
120 Pre-tax profit
-80 Interest paid deduction
40 Taxable income
x 20% Business tax rate
8 Business tax
=> $ 32 AFTR=-TAX NEr PROFIT
INVESTMENT CORPORATION
$ 80 Gross income (interest)
-80 Dividend paid deduction
0 Taxable income










As in the previous example, return of the capital to the individual investor (via
the middle corporation) will leave her with $600 after tax.59
Use of an intermediary corporation can create complete tax neutrality between
debt and equity in this proposed tax system. Rather than require the parties to
incur the cost of such a charade, it is better to modify the proposal to treat
loans to business entities as deductible by the lender and income to the borrower.
Comparison of this proposed system, as modified above, to Professor An-
drews' cash flow consumption tax reveals that the two are very similar. The
critical variation developed in this article is that Professor Andrews taxes the
59. Although a multiple party structure allows a loan to achieve the same tax benefits as
an equity investment, it cannot be used to increase or multiply the investment tax benefits
beyond those described in the preceding two examples. Insertion of another interim corporation
will do no more than shift the point of enjoyment of the described tax benefits or create wash
transactions for one or more of the corporations.
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initial capital and the earnings thereon at a zero tax rate until they are withdrawn
for consumption; by comparison, the system developed herein allows invested
capital and re-invested earnings only the smaller favor of a reduced tax rate
until they are withdrawn for consumption.
As a convenience for taxpayers with relatively simple investments in securities
and cash accounts, a taxable investment trust could be used. Such a trust would
be taxed under the business tax rules and rates described herein. If all contri-
butions and withdrawals were required to be in cash, an institutional trustee
could calculate the tax results at year end, and provide a completed business
entity tax return (Form 1080-BE) and a Form 1099 to the owner and the IRS.
Current experience with IRA trusteeship shows that this could be done easily,
efficiently, and affordably, thus saving many taxpayers the additional compli-
cations of forming and reporting on a more traditional business entity.
C. Problems Arising from Individual Borrowing
One final difference between the two systems is that the Andrews proposal,
in addition to the rules discussed above, also requires individuals to include
their borrowing in their gross income.6w Under such a rule, borrowed money
that is promptly invested has no net effect, because the income created by the
borrowing is offset by an equal deduction for the investment. Loan proceeds
that are spent on consumption remain as a positive component of taxable
income. Such a rule is necessary to prevent a taxpayer from creating a net
deduction that shelters his consumed income by investing borrowed money.
The same potential for abuse by taxpayers with strong borrowing ability exists
in the system proposed herein. Consider a taxpayer who earns a $60,000 annual
salary and spends it all on personal consumption. In late December he borrows
$60,000 and purchases stock with it, pledging the stock as collateral. The
investment deduction fully offsets the salary income, and he pays no tax. The
policy behind this proposed system is to encourage taxpayers to consume less
and save more. He has consumed his entire salary, and his investment does not
represent any net savings to the economy; he simply invested someone else's
savings. He gets the benefit of this tax system without furthering the policy on
which it is based.
Although the preceding example is helpful in illustrating the concern about
using borrowed funds to create a net deduction that shelters one's consumed
income, a slightly different fact pattern is more helpful in showing how the
shelter operates, and how it can be prevented. Assuming a system in which
loan proceeds are not income, consider a case in which the $60,000 loan
proceeds are contributed to a corporation, thus generating a $60,000 deduction
and a $24,000 tax savings for the individual investor in a 40% tax bracket.
60. Andrews, supra note 20, at 1153.
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Consider a very hypothetical accountant who completes the investor's tax return
that morning, and an equally hypothetical IRS which delivers the $24,000 refund
that afternoon. The $24,000 is immediately contributed to the corporation,
creating a $9,600 refund, which is also contributed to the corporation. If the
ever decreasing refunds are invested ad infinitum (hereafter described as "circular
refunds"), the ultimate cumulative refund is $40,000 and the total investment
reaches $100,000. Therefore, rather than using the first deduction to shelter
consumed income, this taxpayer uses the series of deductions to increase the
total amount of his investment. 6'
First, analyze the results under the Andrews cash flow consumption tax, if
the borrowing is not treated as income. A classical consumption tax such as
the Andrews system places no tax burden on invested principal or investment
earnings until the funds are withdrawn for consumption. Under such a system,
if the initial borrowing by the individual is not treated as income, the taxpayer
can earn a profit from the tax system even though his use of the funds earns
no economic profit. In the following illustration, the investment is clearly
profitless because the taxpayer borrows at 10% interest and then invests at a
10% rate of return. He invests the loan proceeds and the circular refunds for
one year, then withdraws all principal and earnings from the investment, pays
and deducts the interest due, pays tax on the remaining amount, repays the
loan principal, and finds himself with a windfall profit.
CLASSICAL CONSUMPTION TAX
(Except individual borrowing not included in income)
$ 60,000 Loan proceeds (not income, therefore no tax)
$100,000 Invest loan proceeds plus $40,000 of circular
refunds; i.e., all tax savings are also invested
x 10% Annual rate of return on investment
10,000 Investment earnings for one year
+100,000 Investment principal
110,000 Withdrawn from the investment
- 6,000 Interest due (deductible)
104,000 Taxable income
-41,600 Tax due at 40% rate
62,400 After-tax proceeds
-60,000 Repayment of loan principal
$ 2,400 Anrm-TAX wnDFAlL PROFIT
In a system which allows complete and immediate deduction of all investments,
net deductions from investing borrowed money are not intended. The $40,000
61. If this circular refunds explanation is not clear, an alternative explanation involves a
taxpayer who initially borrows and invests $100,000. At a 40% tax rate, the $100,000
contribution deduction generates a $40,000 tax refund, which the taxpayer uses to pay down
the loan to $60,000. Thus, he has a net borrowing of $60,000, yet a $100,000 investment.
Using either explanation, the result is the same.
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of unintended circular refunds earned $4,000 profit during the year. The 40%
individual income tax reclaimed $1,600 of that profit plus the $40,000, but the
remaining $2,400 was retained by the taxpayer.
Although the illustration is slightly longer due to the business entity tax and
deductions, the system proposed in this article suffers from the same problem,
as shown below.
PROPOSED INVESTMENT INCENTIVE TAX SYSTEM






















Loan proceeds (not income, therefore no tax)
Loan proceeds plus $40,000 of circular refunds
contributed to a business entity; i.e., all









Total distribution to investor ($8,000 profit plus




Tax due at 40% rate
After-tax proceeds
Repayment of loan principal
AFTER-TAX WINDFALL PROFIT
The most classical, and most obvious, means by which to prevent these
windfalls are to include borrowed money in the individual's gross income.
With that treatment, the deduction for the $60,000 investment or capital
contribution is used to offset the $60,000 of gross income from the bor-
rowing, and cannot be used to generate the $40,000 of circular refunds.
Because the windfall in each case is the after-tax profit earned on the
62. This is not the final version of the proposed system. For purposes of fully displaying
the analytical development of my ultimate proposal, this tentative version allows an interest
deduction by an individual taxpayer, while the ultimate proposal (shown in the next succeeding




$40,000, this change eliminates the windfall. As a necessary corollary to
this additional rule, repayment of the loan principal becomes a deductible
expenditure. 63
Any proposal, however, which includes borrowing in individual income
is politically naive for two reasons, and offers no meaningful alternative
for practical application. First, the concept is too foreign to the average
American taxpayer, after three generations of an income tax system that
ignores borrowing. Second, consumers would be outraged when they were
forced to borrow $16,667 (assuming a 40% tax bracket) to buy a $10,000
car.64 While it may be reasonable to assume that business people are
sufficiently sophisticated and well advised to accept the taxation of business
borrowing and capital contributions, especially when the lender or contrib-
utor receives a concurrent deduction, it is unreasonable to assume similar
acceptance by consumers. Inclusion of individual borrowing in gross income
is not, however, the only way to prevent the windfall profit described above.
An alternative solution, with which American taxpayers have some ex-
perience, is to deny the deduction for interest paid by individuals. 65 A
review of the foregoing numerical illustration of the classical consumption
tax 6 reveals that the iriterest paid and deducted was $6,000, and the after-
tax windfall profit was $2,400. With a 40% tax rate, denial of the $6,000
interest deduction will increase the total tax by $2,400, thus exactly absorbing
the windfall. Such result will occur at any tax rate, because the tax rate
initially determines the amount of the circular refunds, from which the
windfall is earned. The windfall earned and the tax on the nondeductible
interest are therefore synchronized, as long as the tax rate holds constant
throughout the investment. 67 Therefore, in the case of the classical con-
sumption tax, the windfall can be eliminated either by taxing the individual's
borrowing or by denying the individual's interest deduction. 68
63. Andrews, supra note 20, at 1153.
64. If a taxpayer borrows $16,667 and the loan proceeds are included in her income, a
40% tax will claim $6,667, leaving $10,000 to purchase a car.
65. The rule of I.R.C. § 265 (Supp. IV 1986), denying the interest deduction if the loan
proceeds were used to buy tax exempt bonds, has been in the Code since 1917. War Revenue
Act, Pub. L. No. 65-50, §§ 1201, 1207, 40 Stat. 300, 330, 334 (1917). A greater number of
taxpayers have dealt with I.R.C. § 163(d) (West 1988), limiting the interest deduction if the
loan proceeds were used to purchase investment assets, which has been in the Code since 1972.
Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 221, 83 Stat. 487, 574 (1969). Finally, since
1987 almost all individuals who claim itemized deductions have experienced I.R.C. § 163(h)
(West 1988), which totally denies the deduction of interest on (nonresidential) personal use
loans, subject only to modest transition protection which is already more than half gone.
66. See numerical illustration, supra page 684.
67. The effects of changes in the taxpayer's marginal rate from the beginning to the end
of the investment are discussed infra text accompanying note 72.
68. In the classical consumption tax, a difference arises when the individual can invest the
borrowed funds at a rate of return higher than that charged by the lender. Of course, any
successful leveraged investment fits such a description. Denial of the interest deduction only
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In the system proposed by this article, taxing the individual's borrowing
also has the same effect as described above for the consumption tax, and
perfectly eliminates the windfall profit. Denial of the interest deduction,
however, has a slightly different effect, as illustrated below.
PROPOSED INVESTMENT INCENTIVE TAX SYSTEM
(Individual borrowing not included in income




















Loan proceeds (not income, therefore no tax)
Loan proceeds plus $40,000 of circular refunds
contributed to a business; i.e., all tax sav-









Total Distribution to Investor ($8,000 profit
plus $80,000 capital plus $20,000 circular
refunds)
Gross income and taxable income
Tax due at 40% rate
After-tax proceeds
Repayment of loan principal plus interest
SHORTFALL
In this proposed system, denying the individual interest deduction does
not produce the same result as the classical remedy of including individual
borrowing in income. The latter merely eliminates the windfall, while the
former consumes the entire windfall and creates a shortfall. The amount of
the shortfall will vary with the business tax rate, and as a profit margin
(investment return minus interest rate) is introduced into the analysis.
captures the windfall to the extent the investment return is equal to the interest rate. Because
denial of the interest deduction (rather than taxation of the loan proceeds) allows the circular
refunds to develop at the beginning of the investment, the profit (investment rate minus interest
rate) earned on the circular refunds, reduced by the individual tax on such profit, will remain
as an uncaptured windfall. This marginal windfall is prevented by the alternative remedy of
including all borrowing in income, so the effects of these two remedies are not identical. The
comparison of these two remedies in the context of the tax system proposed by this article,
segaptext accompanying however, is substantially different, as discussed infra pages 687-88.
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The cause of this shortfall is the business tax on contributed capital.
Although the individual's borrowing is not included in his income, when
he contributes the loan proceeds to the entity, the business tax has the
effect of a partial, indirect tax on his borrowing. The denial of the interest
deduction and the tax on borrowing are presented above as alternative
remedies for the windfall. Here the interest deduction is denied completely,
and the tax on borrowing is imposed in part (at the 20% corporate rate
instead of the 40% individual rate), so the remedies are being used cumu-
latively instead of alternatively. The overkill creates the shortfall.
Of course, the shortfall can be paid by investing the funds at a higher
rate than is being charged by the bank. If the money is borrowed at 10%,
and the business tax rate is 20%, the business must earn 12.5% just to pay
the shortfall. 69 The individual taxpayer will no longer have to pay the
shortfall from separate funds, but the apparent 2.5% profit margin will be
completely consumed to pay the extra tax. If the rate of return on the
investment exceeds the threshold level necessary to pay the shortfall, the
excess return produces an appropriate amount of after-tax profit. For
example, if a 10% interest rate and a 20% business tax rate require a
threshold investment return of 12.5% to pay the shortfall, and the business
earns 14.5%, that 2% excess (14.5% - 12.5%) will provide the investor
with a return (after paying tax, including the shortfall, and principal and
interest due to the bank) equal to 2% of the original borrowed amount,
minus the business tax applicable to that 2% (i.e., 0.4%). The net after-
tax, after-bank return will be 1.6% of the borrowed amount, with no
additional profit from the circular refunds.
This reflects a tax penalty on an individual's contributions of borrowed
money to a business entity, but it is not a cause for concern. The bank can
loan the money directly to the business, and the interest paid will be
deductible by the business. If necessary, the individual can guarantee the
loan, but will not be allowed to claim any deduction for a capital contri-
bution to the business entity. 70 The main purpose of this proposed tax
system is to encourage individuals to save more and consume less. People
are not furthering that purpose when they invest money borrowed from a
69. Mathematically, the "breakeven point" at which the profit will just pay the shortfall,
is expressed as:
required investment rate = Interest rate
I - business tax rate
(I find it especially interesting that the individual tax rate is not a factor in this calculation as
long as such rate remains constant throughout the investment.) Applying the numbers used in
the text produces the following results:
10% 1 0 % = 12.5%
1 -0.2 0.8
70. If he is later forced to pay on the guaranty, he will be allowed a deduction then.
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bank;71 by definition, the money in the bank has already been saved, by
someone else. Only when they invest their own, true equity funds are they
effectively reducing consumptive demand and increasing capital supply in
the nation's economy. The small tax penalty described above will be more
effective than any army of administrative rules and personnel at restricting
the reshuffling of other people's savings in search of tax benefits.
In the simple numerical illustration used above,72 the tax penalty seems
excessive and unnecessary to prevent the windfall. However, any mechanism
that just barely captures the windfall in a perfectly stable situation will
leave part of the windfall untouched if either the investor or the business
entity is subject to a higher tax rate when a deduction is taken than when
the corresponding income is recognized. Changes in tax rates, whether
statutory or by change in taxpayer circumstances, are often predictable in
the tax year preceding the change. For example, the illustration on page
687 shows that with a 40% individual tax rate, 20% business tax rate, 10%
interest rate, and 10% investment return, a $60,000 loan produces a $100,000
net contribution and a $1,200 shortfall after one year. If the individual
investor's tax rate dropped from 40% at the time of contribution to 38.9%
at the time of distribution, the $1,200 shortfall would be eliminated. That
original illustration required a 12.5% rate of return to offset the shortfall
with greater earnings. This reveals that the system is more vulnerable to
games based on rate variations than to interest/investment rate arbitrage.
Therefore, the modest penalty reflected in the shortfall is a desirable
protective device against abuse. It does not impede any bona fide investments
searching for economic profits in the market, because those can be pursued
by direct entity borrowing. Ideally, the penalty and shortfall would be
larger, to referee the games even more strictly.7 3
Any serious proposal to deny individuals an interest deduction must
include a careful discussion of whether such a rule is feasible. For purposes
of such a discussion, there are four main categories of interest now being
71. Of course, investment of others' bank deposits is an important function in our economy.
One of my fundamental premises in writing this article, however, is that the decision between
one type of investment and another should be entirely market driven. Tax benefits should be
offered only at the border between consumption and saving.
72. See numerical illustration supra page 687.
73. This vulnerability to tax rate variation windfalls is not unique to the rule, proposed
herein, which denies the interest deduction to defeat deferral windfalls. The alternative remedy,
treating borrowed money as income and loan repayments (principal and interest) as deductions,
also is subject to rate variation strategies. Under the latter rule, a taxpayer who expects her
tax rate to rise substantially next year will borrow money this December (income) and contribute
it to a corporation (deduction) in January.
The difference in the rates for those two years, multiplied by the amount of the loan,
represents the tax savings. Although conventional tax analysis would treat such a plan as
incurring the tax cost one year before the tax benefit is received, most people pay taxes quite
currently through wage withholding and quarterly estimated tax payments, so in most cases
the benefit will be received within three months after the cost is incurred.
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paid by individuals: investment interest, 74 trade and business interest,"7
personal (nonresidence) interest, 76 and home mortgage interest.7 7
Because the tax system proposed herein will lead all business and invest-
ment activities (and, therefore, deductions) into separately taxable business
entities, individuals will not be affected if their deductions for investment
interest and trade and business interest are repealed. The deduction for
personal, nonresidence interest has already been repealed by the 1986 Act,7 8
subject only to modest transition protection that is already more than half
gone.79 The only interest category for which this proposal would raise
serious contention is home mortgage interest. Realistically, some significant
amount of interest on a taxpayer's home mortgage will remain deductible,
in spite of the strong theoretical arguments against it. The combined
provisions of the 1986 Act and the 1987 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act80 [hereinafter, the 1987 Act], however, already have begun to limit the
deductibility of home mortgage interest. They define "qualified residence
interest," which is deductible, as the interest on a purchase money mortgage
of $1,000,000 or less, plus the interest on a home equity loan of $100,000
or less.8'
Because all money, including all borrowed money, is fungible, any sig-
nificant category of deductible interest creates an unstoppable loophole in
a rule restricting interest deductions. That is true of the current attempts
to disallow deductions for some types of interest, 82 place limits on others,8 3
and allow still other types to be deducted without limit. For the millions
of upper and upper-middle class taxpayers who have the financial strength
to borrow significant amounts without pledging as collateral the asset being
purchased with the loan proceeds, interest categorization is just a game, as
described in the following paragraph. Only if playing the game is more
effort than it is worth will the interest deduction limits be respected.
74. I.R.C. § 163(d) (West 1988).
75. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982).
76. I.R.C. § 163(h)(1) (West 1988).
77. Some of these categories can be further divided into subcategories which are not
relevant to the current discussion.
78. I.R.C. § 163(h)(1) (West 1988).
79. I.R.C. §§ 163(h)(6), 163(d)(6)(B) (Supp. IV 1986).
80. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10,102, 101 Stat.
1330 (1987).
81. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (West 1988).
82. I.R.C. § 163(h) (West 1988), adopted in 1986, prohibits the deduction of personal
(nonresidence) interest, subject only to modest transition rules, which expire at the end of
1990.
83. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (West 1988), adopted in 1986, limits the amount of home acquisition
debt which can give rise to deductible "qualified residence interest";. I.R.C. § 163(d) (West
1988), in effect since 1972, limits the deduction of interest on debt incurred to purchase
investments.
84. I.R.C. § 163(a) (1982).
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That is also true of the proposed system, but here the game must be
played on a narrower field, because the categories with the largest potential
for borrowing (business and investment) will generate nondeductible interest
for individuals. A taxpayer will no longer be able to borrow $10,000 to
finance a vacation, then point to some $10,000 business or investment
expenditure and say, "I spent the loan proceeds on that, and $10,000 of
my own cash on the vacation, so the interest is deductible." If an individual
taxpayer incurs investment, business, or personal nonresidence interest and
wants to deduct it, she will have to disguise it as qualified residence interest.
Because the current definition of qualified residence interest encompasses
only the interest on loans made to acquire or substantially improve her first
or second home (plus $100,000 of unrestricted home equity loans, which
should be repealed in connection with the proposed tax system),8s her ability
to re-characterize other interest as deductible is substantially reduced, com-
pared to current law.
This game will also be played on a much shorter field, because current
law places an absolute limit of $1,000,000 on home acquisition debt that
generates deductible qualified residence interest. For most taxpayers the
lender will impose a much lower limit on their ability to borrow for an
asset that produces no income. For taxpayers who do not suffer such credit
limits, this $1,000,000 ceiling will curtail their ability to incur nonresidence
interest and disguise it as a deductible type. The opportunity will arise only
when the taxpayer is ready to purchase or substantially improve a home,
and has the ability to do so either with his own cash or with borrowed
funds. Rather than make the home expenditure with the cash on hand, and
later be forced to incur nondeductible interest and the previously described
tax penalty on an investment loan, he will borrow for the home and retain
his cash for investment. Depending on the nature of the regulatory tracing
rules, he may be required to invest the cash first, so the home loan will
not be tainted by the presence of readily available equity funding.
As mentioned earlier, if any type of interest is deductible, a loophole is
created for the disguise and deduction of other types of interest. Although
the treatment of qualified residence interest as the only type deductible by
individuals will create such a loophole, and such hole cannot be effectively
covered, the defimition of the type of deductible interest can place natural
limits on the size of the hole. Those limits can be reasonably well enforced.
Even though wealthy taxpayers will certainly buy homes with borrowed
money, and investments, cars and vacations with their own cash, thus
qualifying the interest as deductible, the $1,000,000 limit of current law will
put a very effective limit on the amount of interest re-characterization they
can achieve. At a 12% interest rate, a single taxpayer or a married couple
85. In my opinion, it should be repealed even under the existing system.
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could only deduct, at most, $120,000 of ersatz home mortgage interest per
year. Furthermore, if the current $100,000 home equity loan allowance is
repealed (as it should be), and the $1,000,000 ceiling is lowered (as it should
and probably will be),86 the size of this loophole will be enforceably reduced,
both on a national and a per taxpayer level.
A much larger group of upper-middle class taxpayers will be financially
unable to enjoy the full $120,000 per year interest deduction. The tax game
envisioned above requires a player to have both $1,000,000 cash and
$1,000,000 borrowing ability, and be willing to live in a $1,000,000 home,
to play the game to the fullest. The lower of those three categories, in any
particular case, will be the effective limit on the taxpayer's ability to take
advantage of the deduction. Because most individual taxpayers have bor-
rowing power and home price goals which greatly exceed their cash reserves,
the lack of cash will be the effective limit for most taxpayers who are under
the $1,000,000 debt ceiling. For example, a person who has $150,000 cash
and a $500,000 loan authorization can contribute all the cash to a business
and use the loan to buy a home. If he had used the cash plus a $350,000
loan to buy the home, and the remaining $150,000 of the loan authorization
to fund the capital contribution, the interest on the latter portion of the
loan would be nondeductible. Therefore, the former allocation of resources
is the one he will make, and arguably he will have disguised up to $18,000
of investment interest (assuming a 12% interest rate) as qualified residence
interest.17 But there is no way he can make a $200,000 investment and still
deduct all the interest, because that will force him to down to a $450,000
home, which cannot carry $500,000 of qualified residence debt. The $50,000
loan shifted to the investment cannot be disguised. Similarly, if he wants
only a $100,000 home, and buys it entirely with borrowed money, he can
deduct only $12,000 interest (at 12%), regardless of what he does with the
rest of his cash and borrowing power. The lowest of available cash, available
loan authorization, and home cost, is the effective ceiling on re-character-
86. A recent article proposed the repeal of the home equity loan deduction and a reduction
of qualified home acquisition debt from $1,000,000 to $200,000. "While it may be reasonable
to encourage middle-class home ownership, there is no reason to subsidize palaces." Barusch,
Making the Income Tax More Progressive, 40 TAx NoTEs 961, 965 (1988). Hopefully, the
$1,000,000 ceiling is just the camel's nose in the tent, and Congress will gradually lower it to
raise revenues without raising tax rates.
87. Probably the most defensible reallocation of his transactions, from a tax enforcement
perspective, is to allocate the interest proportionately among all his assets, by purchase price.
In this simple illustration, the house represents 75.4% of his expenditures, so 75.4% of the
loan and 75.4% of the cash should be deemed to have been applied to the home purchase.
The remainder (24.6%) of his cash and credit resources should be allocated to the investment
contribution. With the interest allocated in the same manner, 75.4% would be deductible and
24.6% ($4,428) would not. Under this approach, one would probably conclude that only




ization of interest through shuffling of resources. Because only 5,120,061
American households have a net worth in excess of $250,000,88 only a
modest number of people will be able to play on a significant portion of
the $1,000,000 playing field. The amount of abuse of this loophole, whether
measured in terms of revenue loss or moral outrage, should be tolerable.
D. Summary
The tax system described and proposed herein meets the various goals
and criteria established at the beginning of this article. It allows a clear
distinction between the taxation of consumed income and the taxation of
invested income. The force of that distinction can be varied easily by
Congress, simply by changing the differential between the individual and
business entity tax rates. Interestingly, increasing and decreasing the level
of investment incentive are separated from the issue of increasing or
decreasing federal revenues. Traditional investment incentives have always
been revenue losers.8 9 If Congress wants to induce more investment without
reducing revenues, it can increase the tax rate differential by increasing the
top individual rates, at least within a reasonable range of rates.
This system will cause all business and investment income and deductions
to be reported on business entity tax returns (all business entities will be
taxable, using a single tax return form, and a single set of rules and rates),
with only consumed income and personal deductions reported on individual
returns. As a result, Congress can freely adopt rates and substantive tax
rules applicable only to one of those categories, without compromise or
concern over the unintended effect on the other category.
The proposed system adopts a use-based form of tax incentive, which is
probably more effective at affecting taxpayer behavior than a source-based
incentive. 90 Because the benefit is a continuing one, and only continues until
the investment is withdrawn for consumption, the system creates a watchdog
at the entity gates, constantly discouraging (although not prohibiting) con-
sumptive withdrawals.
Although the system discourages consumptive withdrawals, there is no
discouragement of movement from one business entity to another. Thus,
part of the lock-in effect91 of current tax law is eliminated. Income earned
88. Bu. Au OF THE CENsus, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTiCAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNrED STATES: 1988, Table No. 726. The foregoing authority uses data from 1984.
89. Supply side advocates continue to deny this. Their denials, however, carry less and less
weight, as the supply side Reagan deficits continue to mount. See supra note 18.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
91. A person who bought Chrysler stock at $6 per share and watched it rise to $30 might
then decide that a better future is found in Ford stock, but the specter of paying $8 per share
in tax on the $24 gain (33% tax rate, see I.R.C. § l(a), (g) (Supp. IV 1986)) might dissuade
her from selling the Chrysler stock. She is "locked-in" to the Chrysler stock.
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by Corporation A and distributed to Shareholder X for reinvestment in
Partnership B will bear the same total tax as income which A retains. The
distributed income will be sheltered from A's tax by the distribution de-
duction, sheltered from X's tax by the contribution deduction, and taxed
only to B.9
Consider, for a moment, the general outline of what has been described
above. This proposal constitutes a meshing of a classical consumption tax
system for individuals with an income tax system for business entities. The
taxation of capital contributions as income to the recipient entity is not a
familiar element in an income tax, but is necessary in this dichotomous
structure to prevent investment capital (and the earnings thereon) from
totally avoiding taxation.
III. TREATMENT OF NONCASH CONTRIBUTIONS AND DISTRIBUTIONS
A. Contributions of Assets Other Than Cash
Cash contributions and distributions are handled simply in the proposed
system. Contributions (and loans) are deductible by the investor, and income
to the entity. Distributions, whether liquidating or nonliquidating, whether
of earnings or capital, are deductible by the entity and income to the
recipient; and so are loan repayments.
Noncash contributions and distributions must be considered separately
because, unlike cash, they usually have bases that differ from their values.
Current law provides for nonrecognition of gain or loss in many instances
of contributed assets.93 Such a rule reflects a policy not to burden an
incorporation or partnership formation with tax liability. To determine what
rule is appropriate in the new system, one must first consider the factual
settings in which the issue is likely to arise. Business and investment assets
purchased after the proposed system is adopted will almost always be
purchased by a taxable business entity, even if it is nothing more than a
sole proprietorship with a separate tax identification number and independ-
ent taxpayer status. Any well advised individual will use an entity to purchase
such assets, to take advantage of the rate differential. After a brief transition
period in which current businesses and investments are promptly transferred
to taxable business entities, noncash contributions from individuals to
businesses will consist primarily of personal use assets which the individual
is converting (or pretending to convert) to business or investment use.
Therefore, the primary concern in the case of noncash contributions by
individuals is to prevent either party from recognizing a deduction or other
92. Lock-in of corporate operating assets containing potential gain will still exist.
93. I.R.C. §§ 351, 721(a) (1982).
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tax benefit from a loss that accrued while the asset was being put to personal
use. As long as such potential abuse is prevented, the solution can be based
entirely on an analysis of contributions from one business entity to another.
As illustrated below, if the contributing investor is a business entity, a
net tax deduction equal to the asset basis will be enjoyed by the investor.
This is true whether or not the contribution is a recognition event, and
whether the asset contains a potential gain or loss.
RECOGNITION TREATMENT
Gain Asset
$100 Fair Market Value (FMV)
- 70 Adjusted Basis (A/B)
30 Gain recognized
- 100 Contribution deduction












- 70 Contribution deduction





- 70 Contribution deduction
$70 Net deduction
The foregoing illustration is based on the fundamental tax concepts that
recognized gain creates basis while recognized loss consumes basis, and that
basis is never enjoyed twice or wasted. In order to achieve a zero basis in
the contributor's investment, all basis brought into or created in the trans-
action must be deducted. The deduction of the adjusted basis brought into
the transaction creates a net deduction, whether deducted entirely as a
contribution deduction (gain asset) or partially as a loss deduction and
partly as a contribution deduction (loss asset). Any recognition of gain
creates additional basis, which allows an additional contribution deduction,
but that extra deduction is sufficient only to offset the recognized gain, and
is not available to increase the net deduction.
The current policy of tax neutrality in contributions to partnerships and
corporations is a good one, and should be pursued in implementing any
different tax system or rules. If the net effect on the contributing investor
is always the same, as shown above, the investor is indifferent to the choice
between recognition and nonrecognition, and the proper tax treatment can
be selected by analyzing the alternative effects on the recipient entity.
Guidance in this analysis must be obtained from a review of the central
function of this proposed tax system-to shift the reporting and taxing of
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invested income from the investor to the business entity. To accurately serve
that function, the contribution deduction granted to the investor must be
equal to the income attributed to the entity. When the recognition rule is
analyzed, in the case of a loss asset, the loss deduction must be separated
from the contribution deduction, and only the latter amount attributed as
income to the entity. The recognition rule is analyzed because, with this
proposed system, perhaps nonrecognition is not the only way to achieve the
goal of tax neutrality. The following illustrations use the same numerical
examples as, and certain results from the preceding illustration.
RECOGNITION RULE




$100 Income to the entity
-which compares to-
$ 70 net deduction to investor
(from above)




$45 Income to the entity
-which compares to-
$70 net deduction to investor
(from above)
The first and second elements of the illustration establish the required
equality of contribution deduction and entity income, then the second and
third elements test for the desired tax neutrality. Even though this proposed
system inevitably creates income on the entity's receipt of capital, tax
neutrality would be achieved if it also grants an equal deduction to the
contributor. As shown above, if a noncash capital contribution is a recog-
nition event, net income is created (considering the two parties as a unit)
on contribution of a gain asset, and net loss is created upon a contribution
of a loss asset. Tax neutrality is not achieved in either case.
In contrast, the following illustration applies the same tax neutrality test
in a model which does not require recognition of the investor's potential
gain or loss at the time an asset is contributed to a corporation or other
business entity.
NONRECOGNITION RULE




$70 Income to the entity
-which compares to-





$70 Income to the entity
-which compares to-
$70 Net deduction to investor
(from above)
This illustrates that, even in this fundamentally different approach to
taxation of investors and business entities, nonrecognition of the inherent
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gain or loss in a contributed asset is still necessary to achieve tax neutrality
in equity capital contribution decisions and transactions. Because nonrecog-
nition leads to a contribution deduction equal to the asset's adjusted basis,
the amount of the adjusted basis will also be attributed as income to the
business and adopted as the entity's adjusted basis in the asset. Conveniently,
fair market value need not be determined. This analysis envisions a business
entity as the contributing investor, but the rules proposed above will provide
the same neutrality to an individual investor; except the intentional non-
neutrality of the rate differential, which will encourage all contributions,
whether of cash or other assets.
As mentioned earlier, however, contributions of personal use assets by
individuals represent a potential for abuse. A person could buy a $10,000
car, use it for five years for purely personal purposes, then contribute it to
a corporation and claim a $10,000 deduction. Current law on deduction of
personal casualty losses,94 or on depreciation of personal use assets which
are converted to business use, 95 provides a familiar and simple defense
against such abuse. The deduction for contribution of a personal use asset
should be limited to the lesser of its adjusted basis or fair market value at
the date of contribution. To reduce the number of disputes over fair market
value, the adjusted basis of a depreciable, personal use asset should be
defined (for this purpose) as its initial basis minus the depreciation that
would have been allowed if it always had been used for business purposes.
Such a rule would place a lower ceiling on the contributor's room for an
inflated value estimate.96
In another potential abuse area, the high value of the contribution
deduction and the zero basis of stock and bonds create strong temptations
and large rewards for fraudulent reporting of contributions and securities
sales. Transactions handled through registered brokers can be monitored
simply. The brokers submit to the IRS the identities of the parties, the
security involved, and the amount of proceeds. 97
Use of such information will be especially effective under the proposed
system, because the zero basis in all securities will cause the entire sale
proceeds to be income to the seller. A broker's report on the seller will be
equivalent to an employer's Form W-2 on an employee.
Transactions that are not handled by a registered broker can be effectively
policed by a reporting requirement similar to that adopted for the alimony
94. See, e.g., Helvering v. Owens, 305 U.S. 468 (1939); I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (1982); Treas.
Reg. § 1.165-7(b)(1) (1960).
95. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(g)-i (1960).
96. This idea arises from a discussion with Mary Lou Fellows and from Epstein, The
Consumption and Loss of Personal Property Under the Internal Revenue Code, 23 STAN. L.
Ray. 454, 463-64 (1971).
97. Such reporting, to the Service and the taxpayer, is already required under I.R.C. §
6045 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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deduction in 1984.98 The payor (here, purchaser) is required to report the
name and tax identification number of the recipient (seller).
Finally, the largest abuse potential lies in the ability of a corporation (or
other business entity) to purchase inventory, equipment, and any other
assets by issuing stock (or similar business interest) for such assets, then
promptly redeeming that stock for cash. The seller will have the same
amount of gain as from a direct cash sale of the asset, and so will be
indifferent to the structure of the transaction. The buyer will have income
(from the "contribution") equal to the seller's basis in the asset, and a
deduction (from the "redemption distribution") equal to the fair market
value of the asset. If, as is generally true for newly manufactured or
constructed items, the value is greater than the seller's basis, that excess
will be the amount of the buyer's net deduction from the combined
transactions.
The first step in stopping such manipulation is to retain the control
requirement found in the current version of section 351, and expand its
coverage to include partnerships. The noncash contribution qualifies for
nonrecognition only if the contributing investor (or group of concurrently
contributing investors) is in control of the entity immediately after the
contribution.9 It will be very rare that an arm's length supplier of materials,
or equipment, or even buildings will be able to receive an 80% interest in
the acquiring entity, so gain will be recognized when such a supplier
contributes the desired asset to the acquiring entity. The nonrecognition of
gain on the contribution is the fuel that drives the scam described above,
so denial of that nonrecognition will stop the abuse.
After adoption of the control requirement, however, the same sort of
abuse can be achieved by shifting to a three party transaction. The seller
contributes the desired asset to a new, shell corporation, which has no other
assets. Therefore, the seller will become the sole shareholder of the shell
corporation, satisfying the control requirement and qualifying for nonre-
cognition on the contribution. Shortly thereafter, the stock of the shell
corporation is sold to the buyer, which then acquires the assets by liquidation
of, or merger with, the shell corporation. As with the two party transaction
described above, the seller experiences the same tax effect as with a direct
sale, and the buyer and the shell (viewed as a unit) enjoy a net deduction
equal to the seller's gain.
No author wants to propose an idea that must carry an excessive burden
of anti-abuse rules, 0 ' but it appears that the foregoing abuse can be stopped
98. I.R.C. § 215(c) (Supp. IV 1986); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1,215-IT (1984).
99. I.R.C. § 351(a) (1982) makes a cross reference to I.R.C. § 368(c) (Supp. IV 1986),
which defines "control" as 80% of all voting shares and 80% of all nonvoting shares of
stock.




with a relatively simple rule. The most direct solution would be to abandon
the nonrecognition rule for noncash contributions to a controlled corpora-
tion (or other entity). However, that would hinder too many creations of
legitimate subsidiaries. The better response is to make the nonrecognition
dependent upon the contributing investor(s) having control of the recipient
corporation for twelve months after the contribution, rather than the
"immediately after" requirement of current law.
B. Distributions in Kind
As mentioned earlier, cash distributions to investors and loan repayments,
under the proposed system, are deductible by the entity and income to the
recipient. Noncash distributions to investors need further consideration. For
corporate distributions, current law requires recognition of gain (but not
loss) by the distributing corporation if property is transferred as an operating
distribution to a shareholder,'0' recognition of gain and loss if property is
transferred as a liquidating distribution to a shareholder who is not a parent
of the distributing corporation,' °2 and nonrecognition of gain and loss if
property is transferred from a liquidating subsidiary to its parent.' 0' The
current rules for partnership distributions generally provide nonrecognition
of gain and loss for a distributing partnership.? 4
Recognition of gain and loss on corporate distributions to shareholders
was adopted to more fully enforce the double tax of traditional American
corporate taxation. Corporate income is taxed once when the corporation
earns it, and again when the shareholders receive it as dividends or liqui-
dation proceeds. Ordinary operating income cannot avoid that double tax,
but the gain inherent in appreciated assets could avoid it, if those assets
could be distributed without corporate recognition of the gain. Because this
proposed system abandons the double taxation of corporate income, rec-
ognition by the corporation is not required. Both recognition and nonre-
cognition rules can be freely considered, for corporations and other types
of entities.
Consideration of the likely factual situations in this area is helpful.
Because this proposed tax system will cause all business activity to be
conducted by taxable business entities, rather than by individuals, an entity
will rarely, if ever, distribute business assets to an individual investor, unless
the investor intends to promptly recontribute them to another entity. In
that event, the effect on the other business of the tax rule being determined
101. I.R.C. § 311 (Supp. IV 1986).
102. I.R.C. § 336(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
103. I.R.C. § 337 (West 1988).
104. I.R.C. § 731(b) (1982).
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here should also be considered. Another situation which merits special
consideration is the distribution, to an individual investor, of an asset that
can be used by the investor for personal consumptive purposes. The function
of the individual tax in this proposed system is to measure and tax personal
consumption. Ideally the investor will be taxed on the full fair market value
of any distributed assets which he retains for consumption.
In analyzing contributions, the investor was discovered to be indifferent
to the debate between recognition and nonrecognition.105 With respect to
distributions, the distributing entity is indifferent to the same issue, and for
the same reason: The net deduction allowed to the transferor is the same
in each case. If a distribution is a nonrecognition event, the entity will
deduct the adjusted basis of the asset. If a distribution is a recognition
transaction, the entity will experience two tax effects, which will combine
to produce, again, a net deduction equal to the adjusted basis of the
distributed asset. In a recognition distribution, the loss deduction will
consume part of the basis, and therefore the distribution deduction will be
reduced by the amount of the loss; gain recognition will increase the basis
and therefore increase the distribution deduction by just enough to offset
the gain. °6
If the distributing entity is indifferent to this issue, the decision can be
made by reviewing the effect on the investor and any other party which
might be involved, and by considering any basic policy issues which might
be raised. As with contributions, the most important rule is that the entity's
distribution deduction must be equal to the investor's distribution income.
That is necessary to achieve one major goal of this proposed system, which
is to report all consumed income on individual returns, and only invested
income on business returns. The collective purpose of the distribution
deduction and the distribution income is to shift a specific amount of
income from a business to an individual return; therefore, those two items
must be equal.
The main policy consideration in this area is the potential for unintended
tax benefits if a nonrecognition rule is adopted. Sale of an asset by one
business to another clearly is intended to be a taxable event in this system.
If a noncash distribution from a corporation (for example) to a shareholder
is a nonrecognition event, a prospective asset purchaser could instead
purchase stock from the intended seller, and then present the stock for
redemption. The other corporation could transfer the desired asset as the
redemption payment. The result is illustrated as follows:
105. See supra Pt. III. A.
106. The two numerical illustrations on page 695 depict these phenomena with respect to
contributions to the business entity. Distributions from the entity follow the same patterns.
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TRANSACTIONS " 'PURCHASER '  " SELLER' "
1. $100 stock purchase $100 deduction $100 income
2. Redemption with asset
($20 A/B; $100 FMV) 20 income 20 deduction
$ 80 net deduction $ 80 net income
A direct sale of the asset would have produced a net gain of $80. The
same business result can be accomplished using the foregoing structure, with
no net (collective) income to the parties. °7 As structured above, the seller's
position is the same as the sale transaction, and the buyer enjoys the full
benefit, which is the deductibility of most of the purchase price. The parties
can shift as much of the benefit to the seller as they wish, simply by
increasing the price of the stock purchase.
To prevent the unintended opportunity identified above, a noncash dis-
tribution to a shareholder (or investor in any other business entity) must be
a recognition event, as it is in most cases under current law. This conclusion
carries some disadvantages which should be identified. It requires a valuation
of all distributed assets. It leads to a distinction between a distribution from
a subsidiary to a parent (which should certainly be a nonrecognition event),
and a distribution to a noncontrolling shareholder. Both of these disadvan-
tages exist under current corporate tax law, so obviously they are not
intolerable, but it would have been nice to leave them behind. One advantage
of a recognition rule is that an individual investor receiving a consumable
asset, such as a car, will be taxed on the fair market value of that
consumptive withdrawal, rather than the distributing entity's basis in the
asset. Such result is more in keeping with one of the goals of this tax
system, which is to measure and tax personal consumption.
Another necessary anti-abuse rule is to prohibit recognition of loss on a
nonliquidating distribution. Without such a rule, a business could recognize
all its realized losses annually, by distributing its loss assets to its owners
and promptly receiving them as capital contributions. There would be no
net offsetting tax cost to the owners. Such a rule creates an unfortunate
distinction between liquidating and nonliquidating distributions, but that
problem accompanies the similar rule under current law.
107. This abuse potential is thoroughly demonstrated by Esmark, Inc. and Affiliated
Companies v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 171 (1988), in which, pursuant to a pre-existing
agreement, Mobil Oil Corporation bought 54% of Esmark's stock on the open market and
tendered it to Esmark for redemption. The agreed consideration for the redemption was the
stock of Esmark's oil producing subsidiary. The entire transaction was undertaken as a means
to "sell" the oil subsidiary to Mobil. A cash sale would have been a taxable event for Esmark,
with a tax liability in excess of $100,000,000. Id. at 172-79. Under the law at that time, a
redemption transaction structured in this manner did not require recognition of gain by the
distributing corporation (Esmark). Id. at 181-82. The Tax Court upheld the nonrecognition
treatment claimed by Esmark. Id. at 197-200.
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IV. SIDE EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM
The intended effects of the proposed system are described above. Of
course, any significant change in a ubiquitous law such as the Code will
inevitably affect people's actions in many ways besides the intended effects.
Some side effects of this proposed system may be difficult or impossible to
anticipate. Others are quite predictable.
The capital gain preference can be permanently put to rest. The only
legitimate justifications for that preference, of the many that have been
suggested,'10 are as an unashamed investment incentive and as a very crude
inflation adjustment to basis. The rate differential of the proposed system
will provide as much investment incentive as Congress desires, so the use
of the capital gain preference for investment incentive becomes unnecessary.
Because the only business and investment assets held by individuals will be
debt and equity interests in taxable business entities (primarily stock, bonds,
and partnership interests), all of which will have a zero basis, the inflation
effect on basis will no longer be a concern for individual taxpayers. For
operating assets of business entities, tax distortion from inflation will still
be a legitimate concern. The smallest, and therefore probably the least
sophisticated, entities will have a zero basis in most of their durable assets
due to the deduction available under section 179.'09 Businesses which are
too large to deduct all of their capital expenditures under section 179 should
have the resources and sophistication to adjust all their asset bases for
inflation. The Code should be amended to allow such adjustments, which
could be made quite simply and inexpensively with computerized accounting
systems. Basis adjustment is the most appropriate means to deal with the
distorting effects of inflation on the taxation of income from capital.
Finally, the capital loss limitations can be repealed without suffering great
revenue loss, because individuals and small businesses, with their zero basis
assets, will never suffer capital losses. After the 1986 Act, anticipated re-
enactment of the capital gain preference and the revenue costs of allowing
capital loss deductions are the only factors keeping the thousands of capital
gain and loss provisions and references in the Code. The funeral for these
friends would be a rare pleasure, but there is not time or need to identify
them all here. It will suffice to say that the foregoing resolution of those
108. Blum, A Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAMEs 247 (1957).
109. I.R.C. § 179 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) allows a taxpayer to deduct, in the year of
purchase, up to $10,000 of expenditures on equipment to be used in a trade or business. The
deduction is phased out, rather quickly, for taxpayers who purchase more than $200,000 of
equipment during the year. To achieve the effect described in the text, in connection with this
proposed system, the scope of § 179 should be expanded to include all types of capital




two factors will, by itself, allow a tremendous shortening and simplification
of the Code.
As described in detail earlier, the traditional distinctions between debt
and equity are totally eliminated.110 The attempts to distinguish between the
two for tax purposes can be stopped. Section 385,111 which was intended to
help separate debt from equity, but failed,112 can be repealed. Concern of
clients, tax professionals, IRS agents, and the courts, about "thin
capitalization""' will become history. With the capital vs. ordinary distinc-
tion gone, and a zero basis in all stock and bonds, this indifference will be
enjoyed by both the business entity and its investors. Dividends, interest,
redemption of stock or partnership interest, repayment of loans, and pay-
ment of salaries will all be deductible by the entity. Determinations of
whether a salary to an employee-shareholder is reasonable 14 will become
unnecessary.
All the foregoing payments will also be income to the recipients. Sections
302,115 303,116 and 304,17 the special tests for the tax treatment of redemp-
tions, can be repealed. The constructive ownership rules of section 31811
are used primarily in connection with sections 302 and 304, and so will be
greatly reduced in significance.11 9 Because there is no need to identify
dividends as such, the concept of earnings and profits can be abandoned,
and therefore sections 312120 and 316121 can be repealed. 1 2
Section 305(a)1 3 provides the very simple rule that a corporation's distri-
bution of a stock dividend is not income to the shareholders. The rest of
section 305,124 and sections 306121 and 307,'2 provide rather complicated
rules to regulate stock dividends and prevent their use in tax avoidance
110. The leading corporate tax treatise has 83 pages dedicated to debt-equity problems. B.
BnTKER & J. EUSTicE, supra note 56, at 4-1 to 4-83.
111. I.R.C. § 385 (1982).
112. See B. BITTER & J. EUsMCE, supra note 56, at 4-11 to 4-12.
113. See id. at 4-23 to 4-24.
114. See Charles McCandless Tile Service v. United States, 422 F.2d 1336 (Ct. CI. 1970);
I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (1982); Harold's Club v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 861 (9th Cir. 1965).
115. I.R.C. § 302 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
116. I.R.C. § 303 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
117. I.R.C. § 304 (West 1988).
118. I.R.C. § 318 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
119. I.R.C. § 318 is also used in connection with other surviving sections, so it cannot be
repealed.
120. I.R.C. § 312 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
121. I.R.C. § 316 (1982).
122. Repeal of I.R.C. § 312 is dependent upon either repealing the alternative minimum tax
(discussed infra note 128 and accompanying text) or abandoning the use of earnings and
profits as a tool for calculating alternative minimum taxable income.
123. I.R.C. § 305(a) (1982).
124. I.R.C. § 305 (1982).
125. I.R.C. § 306 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
126. I.R.C. § 307 (1982).
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schemes. This trio has become less significant with the 1986 repeal of the
capital gain deduction. The elimination of all capital distinctions and the
zero basis for all stock will allow the entire trio of sections to be repealed,
except the simple rule of section 305(a).
The zero basis in all business interests (both debt and equity) will allow
a dramatic narrowing of section 1014,127 which currently allows a fair market
value basis of all inherited assets. The most common justification for section
1014 is that estate administrators and beneficiaries are often unable to
determine the decedent's actual basis in his or her assets. The one person
most capable of locating the basis information, without unreasonable effort
and expense, is dead. Under the proposed system, the basis of stock, bonds,
and other business interests will always be zero, which can be determined
even more easily than the fair market value, which must be ascertained
under current law. Even though the retention of the current section 1014
rule for personal use assets represents a flaw from a theoretical tax policy
perspective, the magnitude and significance of that flaw will be greatly
reduced.
If Congress is willing to rely entirely on the individual/business rate
differential for tax-based investment incentives, as this article suggests, the
resulting elimination of all the current, investment-specific tax preferences
will provide another welcome list of shortenings and simplifications too
long to itemize here. Elimination of those preferences will also allow the
repeal of the entire alternative minimum tax system.'28 The alternative
minimum tax has grown, over the last several years, into one of the major
nightmares of taxpayer burden in the Code.
This proposed system clarifies one major issue that has always been
unclear in the American income tax system: the status, or role, of corpo-
rations. A corporation is not an independent entity in any meaningful sense.
It is simply a vehicle which one, or five, or 500,000 persons utilize for
conducting some of their investment and business activities. It is a convenient
vehicle for the shareholders. Under the proposed system, it also becomes a
very convenient vehicle for imposing on the investment and business activities
of the shareholders the lighter tax burden Congress has long tried to provide
for investments and businesses. To respect this philosophy, and to achieve
the goal that every dollar that is saved rather than consumed will receive
the same tax benefit, Congress should repeal the accumulated earnings tax' 29
and the personal holding company tax130 when this proposed system is
enacted.
127. I.R.C. § 1014 (1982).
128. I.R.C. §§ 53-59 (West 1988).
129. I.R.C. §§ 531-37 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
130. I.R.C. §§ 541-47 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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Apart from the philosophical view, a pragmatic analysis calls for the
repeal of the two penalty taxes described in the preceding paragraph. These
penalty taxes place pressure on certain corporations to distribute their income
to the shareholders, for the purpose of triggering the individual tax on the
dividends. Even if one of these penalty taxes is successful at forcing a
corporate distribution, under the proposed system the shareholder can easily
avoid the individual tax on the distribution by contributing the money
received to the same or a different corporation. The contribution deduction
will offset the gross income from the distribution. Therefore, the penalty
taxes will be nothing more than a nuisance, with little substantive effect,
and should be repealed.
Because a corporation will be allowed a deduction for all distributions to
its shareholders, the section 243131 deduction for dividends received by a
corporation will become a double benefit. It should be repealed.
Subchapter S132 allows a corporation to elect to avoid the corporate tax,
and have all of its taxable income taxed directly and annually to the
shareholders, even though the income might not be distributed to them. It
allows a corporation to be taxed like a partnership, and avoid the double
taxation which the current system imposes on corporate profits. The pro-
posed system will eliminate double taxation for all corporations, so the
main purpose of Subchapter S is satisfied. A secondary purpose, or at least
an effect, of Subchapter S, is to tax all corporate profits at the shareholders'
individual tax rates, rather than the corporation's tax rate. One expectation
behind this proposed system is that the business tax rate will be very low,
and will always be lower than most, if not all, of the individual tax rates.
Numerical illustrations herein have used 20% as an assumed business rate,
but that figure was chosen primarily to simplify the arithmetic and make
the illustrations easier to follow. If all other identifiable investment incentives
can be repealed, thus making taxable income an accurate reflection of true
economic profit, perhaps a 15% flat business rate can satisfy the political
and revenue demands on this issue.
If the business rate is less than or equal to the lowest individual rate, no
one will ever elect to be taxed under Subchapter S. Such an election would
not lower the tax burden on anyone, under any circumstances, unless a
shareholder was in a zero tax bracket. Individuals in the zero tax bracket
rarely own corporate stocks, so do not present a concern in this regard.
Any savings they may have can be deposited directly in a personal bank
account. The interest earned will be their own income, and will enjoy the
protection of their zero tax rate. The more important group is the tax
exempt entities, such as pension funds and charitable institutions, but they
131. I.R.C. § 243 (West 1988).
132. I.R.C. §§ 1361-79 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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do not qualify under current law to be shareholders of an S corporation.
Subchapter S status is generally limited to corporations with 35 or fewer
shareholders, all of whom are individuals. Therefore, Subchapter S will
become deadwood, and can be repealed.
Section 7704133 provides a definition of "publicly traded partnership[s]"
and subjects them to the corporate tax system. Because all business entities
will be taxed under a single set of rules and rates, Section 7704 can be
repealed. Future problems of distinguishing corporations from other entities
can be avoided completely.
V. TRANSITION ISSUES
Any major revision of the Code creates transition problems, as has been
learned so well in the last several years. The most significant transition
problem in enacting the proposed system arises from the intended purpose
of the change, rather than any theoretically sound objection. That is, the
purpose of this proposed system is to encourage people to "invest more,
consume less," but promptly after enactment a massive flow of tax benefits
will go to people who have already invested, before enactment, without
needing this encouragement. That flow of tax benefits will be enjoyed as
pre-enactment investments are restructured to generate investment deductions
for their owners.
Objections to this amount, or type of deduction are purely pragmatic
rather than theoretically sound, because a $100 basis in a pre-enactment
investment represents $100 on which tax has already been paid. Adoption
of this proposed system represents a decision that an investment should be
deductible, as long as the same amount is taxed to the investment entity
which receives the funds. Nevertheless, when a thief decides to "go straight,"
he quits stealing, but usually does not feel compelled to reimburse all former
victims. The revenue loss from allowing deductions for all pre-enactment
savings and investments will probably be viewed as a "cost" of enactment,
rather than something that should have been done years ago. That cost
must be identified in greater detail, analyzed, and minimized by some
workable set of transition rules. The following discussion assumes that the
investor contribution deduction and business entity distribution deduction
proposed herein will be intended only for those post-enactment investments
and distributions which are funded by post-enactment earnings.
It is helpful in a situation like this to describe an idealized model rule,
as a starting point and a subsequent guide, even though practical problems
would prohibit the use of such a model. Ideally, on the last day under the
current system, all business and investment assets would be given a zero
133. I.R.C. § 7704 (West 1988).
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basis. Each individual would be required to contribute all his or her available
cash to a corporation or other entity in exchange for zero basis stock or
securities, or similar interests. All partnerships, proprietorships, and other
entities would then become separately taxable entities. After all the foregoing
was accomplished, each business entity would count its cash, and that
amount would be the amount of nondeductible distributions it must make
after enactment of the new system, before it could make any deductible
distributions.
After the foregoing changes, an individual could not take a deduction
for contributing any old assets to a business entity, because an in-kind
contribution generates a deduction equal to the adjusted basis of the asset1 4
(now zero). Sale of the zero basis asset and contribution of the cash would
generate a deduction, but there would be no net deduction because the gain
on the sale would exactly offset the contribution deduction. The individual's
cash is all trapped inside a corporation, and cannot be withdrawn to make
a deductible contribution without, again, creating an offsetting amount of
income. For similar reasons, a business will not be able to create a net
distribution deduction with any of its old assets.
As was indicated earlier, practical problems would prohibit the use of
such a model set of transition rules. The uncompensated confiscation of all
asset bases and the forced contribution of all cash to corporations are
unthinkable. After a long search for an elegant method to achieve the same
ends, this author is abandoning the search.135 Instead, the chart at the end
of this section depicts a pragmatic transition system. Partnerships, proprie-
torships, and S corporations would be allowed to maintain their nontaxable,
flow-through status, or to make an irrevocable election to subject themselves
to the "business entity" taxation system described herein. Such election
would constitute a deemed contribution of all the entity's assets, thus
triggering the deduction for the owners and income to the entity, as described
in this article. In the first year, a substantial but tolerable reduction in tax
benefits for nontaxable business entities puts pressure on them to incorporate
or make the foregoing election to become taxable entities. The main source
of such pressure is that trade and business interest and investment interest
become only 80% deductible for nontaxable entities. The immediate de-
ductibility of contributions assures that all newly issued stock, securities,
and partnership and proprietorship interests will have a zero basis. Because
such contributions will trigger an entity-level tax that is equal to or only
slightly less than the owners' tax savings, the contributions and zero basis
134. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
135. I have not, however, given up the belief that a more intellectually satisfying transition




stocks of the first year will be accomplished at a relatively small cost to
the Treasury.
To begin the gradual establishment of the ultimate rate differential, the
top individual rates are raised slightly, while the business entity rate is made
perfectly flat (i.e., no progression) and lowered slightly. The deductibility
of stock purchases will cause a substantial increase in the market price of
outstanding stock, so a small excise tax is placed on the first post-enactment
sale of any pre-enactment stock (i.e., any stock with a nonzero basis). This
excise will capture some (but not all) of the windfall enjoyed by holders of
outstanding stock, to help finance the change from which they will derive
their unearned profit. Dividends and nondividend (e.g., redemption) distri-
butions become 10% deductible in a smooth, ten year progression toward
total deductibility.
In the second transition year the nondeductible portion of trade and
business and investment interest is raised to 40%, for any nontaxable entities,
as part of the linear five year process of eliminating that deduction for
nontaxable entities. The 35% top individual rate bracket that was created
in the first year is now divided into a 35% and a 370 bracket. This is a
step in the five year movement toward a 15/28/35/40%o structure of
individual tax rates.
The only changes for taxable business entities in the second transition
year are to reduce the business tax rate to 31% (in a ten year movement
to 20%), and to increase the partial deduction for dividends paid to 20%.
The third year changes are only those that follow the multi-year patterns
described above, phasing in or phasing out various rules and rates. The
same is true of the fourth year, except that, in addition, the capital loss
limitation and all other distinctions between capital and ordinary income
and loss are repealed. Also, all other investment incentives are gradually
phased out, beginning in year four and ending in year ten, or sooner. In
particular, the goal for the depreciation system should be one that is
sufficiently schedular (like ACRS) to be simple for taxpayers and the Service,
yet a reasonable approximation of true, economic depreciation. Acceleration
which is now in the depreciation schedules for the purpose of incentive
should be eliminated.
Transition years five through ten consist entirely of continuations of the
gradual changes described above. By the fifth year, the tax system proposed
in this article is substantially in effect, with only modest changes scheduled
for the last five years.
* Notes 136 & 137 are appended to chart, infra page 709. Ed.
136. I steadfastly refuse to swallow the prevailing falsehood that the current system has a
top individual tax rate of 2801o. See, e.g., S. LnD, S. Scuwagz, D. LATHROPE & J. RosENBERG,
FuNDAMENTALS OF CopoRATE TAxArON 53 (2d ed. 1987). The 5% surtax of I.R.C. § l(g)
(Supp. IV 1986) will place many taxpayers in the 33% bracket for 1988.








The U.S. economy, like any other, needs a steady and strong supply of
capital. Ideally, cultural norms would lead people to save a significant part
of their incomes, but that does not seem to be happening. For many decades
the federal government has taken the position that it should exercise its
power in ways that encourage saving, investment, and business activity.
The Internal Revenue Code has long been a major tool in that endeavor.
To date, it has been applied to the task rather haphazardly. Investment
incentives in the Code have given enormous benefits to some investments
and moderate assistance to others, while totally ignoring certain investment
categories. Furthermore, extreme complexity, taxpayer burden, and admin-
istrative difficulty have been created in the process.
This article has described a truly different way to use the Code to
encourage saving and investment. This alternative approach appears to
combine simplicity, effectiveness, and revenue flexibility. Its Achilles heel
is that it requires Congress to withdraw from the apparently fascinating
role of telling Americans how to invest their money. If Congress can exercise
that self-discipline, and allow market forces to lead saved dollars to the
best investments, this proposed system would constitute a welcome revolu-
tion in tax policy.
[Vol. 64:665
